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FOREWORD
As this monograph goes to press, the United
States is waging a trade war against its closest allies
in North America, Asia, and Europe. In Europe, there
is an emerging consensus that European states can no
longer count on the United States to provide leadership and security. In the United States, there is a greater
focus on reciprocity in relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European
Union (EU) and even skepticism over the continued
relevance of those two organizations. In the midst of
this turbulent time, Dr. Joel R. Hillison’s analysis provides a necessary corrective to the pessimistic outlook
on U.S. and European relations. By objectively analyzing the evolution of NATO and the EU and exploring
the interdependence between them and the United
States, he is able to place current relations in context
and provide practical recommendations for improving
that relationship.
This monograph begins by reviewing U.S. interests
in Europe. Arguably, those interests have not changed
since the end of World War II. What has changed, however, is the U.S. approach to furthering those interests.
For the duration of the Cold War and in the immediate aftermath, NATO and the EU, in its various forms,
played an essential role in pursuing U.S. interests and
protecting the interests of U.S. allies. The prosperity
and security of the United States and Europe were
seen as interconnected even as the functions, membership, and capabilities of NATO and the EU changed
over time.
The future of the transatlantic relationship rests on
the grand strategy or strategic vision the United States
decides to pursue going forward. Over its history,
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the United States has pursued different grand strategies based on domestic factors and the challenges and
opportunities presented. Competing visions of U.S.
grand strategy going forward thus have a direct impact
on the relevance of NATO and the EU. Ultimately, the
grand strategy of the United States will determine the
nature of U.S. relations with the EU and NATO and
perhaps even determine their continued existence.
The U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies
Institute is pleased to offer this study as a contribution
to the current debate about the relevance of the EU and
NATO to the United States.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Both European and U.S. foreign policy since World
War II have been built upon a strong, transatlantic
relationship. The European Union (EU) and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have provided
solid institutional bases for this relationship. Yet, contemporary challenges could disrupt this structure
and call into question the very viability of the EU and
NATO. In addition, the “America First” foreign policy
approach views relations with other countries, and
by extension organizations like NATO and the EU,
as a zero-sum game, where equitable burden sharing
seems to be more important than political solidarity
and mutual gains from cooperation. These trends portend significant challenges to U.S. relations with both
NATO and the EU. Overcoming these challenges will
require continued cooperation and trust between the
United States and its allies and partners.
Both the EU and NATO provide the United States
with a comparative advantage in promoting freedom,
prosperity, and security globally, and in the European
region. Not only do these organizations contribute to
the U.S. interest of a Europe whole, free, and at peace,
but they also provide the United States with diplomatic, economic, and military multipliers that give
the United States significant influence in addressing
threats and challenges from states such as Russia and
China, as well as nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda.
NATO began as a conventional military alliance to
balance against the threat of the Soviet Union. Over
time, the Alliance has evolved into a security community that shares common values and interests and is
committed not only to common defense, but also to
cooperative security and crisis management. NATO
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also retains significant military capabilities and geostrategic value in promoting common interests within
and external to the region. The Alliance has always
emphasized collective action and burden sharing
among allied members. This is where the current U.S.
approach to foreign policy is causing tension. Not only
has the United States chosen to go against the consensus
views of its allies in addressing key challenges, it has
also suggested that the U.S. commitment to common
defense might be contingent upon allies living up to
their burden-sharing commitments.
So too has the EU evolved from its humble beginnings in the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), established in 1951, to a customs union and
common market in 1957 with the European Economic
Community (EEC). After the Maastricht Treaty in 1992,
the EU became an imperfect, yet resilient economic and
political union with the ultimate goal of an ever-closer
union among member states. That ambitious goal has
come under increasing pressure from the economic
crisis, increased migration, and Brexit. Like NATO, the
EU has strengthened the ability of European member
states to resist outside aggression. It has also led members to eschew conflict in resolving their internal disputes. As a robust and prosperous union, the EU has
also become an important economic partner of the
United States. In addition to being the largest trading
and investment partner of the United States, the EU
shares the U.S. commitment to the international rule of
law, free markets, and promoting democratic values.
The America First approach to U.S. foreign policy
takes a zero-sum attitude to foreign policy, which
seems to undermine the solidarity and cooperation
that have made NATO and the EU so important to
pursuing both U.S. and European interests. Instead of
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focusing on the benefits of collective action, the United
States has placed a greater emphasis on specific reciprocity with both NATO allies and the EU as a trading
bloc.
In order to continue to promote the mutual interests of the United States and its EU and NATO allies
and partners, the United States should:
• Hedge against unfavorable global trends by
deepening, not reducing its cooperation with
both NATO and the EU;
• Continue to pressure the allies to increase their
capabilities, but take a more nuanced view of
burden sharing; and,
• Promote greater trade and investment between
the United States and the EU and increased
NATO-EU cooperation.
While there are many directions U.S. grand strategy can ultimately take, the EU and NATO will remain
relevant to the United States for the foreseeable future.
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THE RELEVANCE OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION FOR THE UNITED STATES IN
THE 21ST CENTURY
INTRODUCTION
Everything depends upon the alliances with other states,
and upon their military resources.1
—Antoine-Henri Jomini

The international system appears to be at a critical
juncture. Dramatic changes in the external strategic
environment have disrupted long accepted notions of
the U.S. role in the world and its approach to pursing
its national interests. U.S. power has been in a gradual, relative decline since the end of World War II.
Emerging powers increasingly challenge the United
States and the established international order it helped
construct. At the same time, Europe is facing significant external threats from migration, terrorism, Russian aggression, and internal turmoil, as exemplified
by Brexit. Brexit, perhaps more than any other event,
has signaled a challenge to European aspirations for an
ever-closer union among European states. Both European and U.S. foreign policy since the Truman administration have been built upon four main pillars: a
rules-based international order, strong alliances, multilateral cooperation, and the spread of democracy.2 The
European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have provided a solid foundation
for these four pillars. Yet, contemporary challenges
could disrupt this structure and call into question the

1

very viability of the EU and NATO. In addition, the
“America First” foreign policy approach seems to view
relations with other countries, and by extension organizations like NATO and the EU, as a zero-sum game,
where equitable burden sharing seems to be more
important than political solidarity and mutual gains
from cooperation. These trends portend significant
changes to U.S. relations with both NATO and the EU.
With the U.S. administration signaling a new
approach to foreign policy, it is time to reassess the
importance of NATO and the EU in the context of the
current and projected geostrategic environment. This
monograph seeks to inform that discussion. It begins
by reviewing U.S. interests in a democratic and economically prosperous Europe; this has been an enduring aim since the end of World War II. It also examines
the role, function, and capabilities of both NATO
and the EU and how they have adapted over time to
changes in the global environment. Finally, this project assesses the implications of competing visions of
grand strategy on the relevance of NATO and the EU.
Ultimately, the grand strategy of the United States will
determine the nature of U.S. relations with the EU and
NATO and perhaps even determine their continued
existence. The monograph ends with some recommendations on how NATO and the EU can be used to
pursue U.S. national interests in the future. The salient
conclusion is that no matter what grand strategy the
United States adopts, as long as NATO remains intact
and the EU holds together, both will remain relevant:
NATO as a security provider and the EU either as a
partner, or as a competitor.
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U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE
The relevance of NATO and the EU are directly
related to how they support or hinder the achievement of U.S. national interests. National interests drive
policy and strategy formulation and exist independently from threats in the contemporary strategic environment. While this may seem obvious, a
high-level panel of national security experts noted
that these terms are often conflated. “Many debates
fail to recognize the distinction between interests and
threats, since a vivid threat is often needed to remind
one of an interest that would otherwise go unnoticed
or unattended.”3 At the most basic level, U.S. national
interests, sometimes referred to as core interests, are
espoused in the founding documents of the nation.
These core interests are enduring in nature, though the
policies pursued in support of them change over time.
From the dawn of the Cold War, the fates of the
United States and Western Europe were bound
together by the devastation of two world wars and the
necessity of confronting the Soviet bloc. Europe was
dependent upon the United States for security and
economic reconstruction. The United States looked
at Europe as the front line in the war against communism and as a partner in creating and sustaining a new
world order. Thus, the United States took a broad view
of its interests, a view that held until the early 21st
century. In 2000, a bipartisan Commission on America’s National Interests articulated some of those U.S.
national interests as:
• Limited threat of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) attacks on U.S. and forces abroad.
• Survival and cooperation of U.S. allies.
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• The viability and stability of major global
systems.
• Productive relations with China and Russia.4
The same commission identified “a Europe whole,
free and at peace” as a vital U.S. interest.5 This was
nothing new. The initial articulation of this interest
harkens back to President Harry Truman, who realized that the United States could never again withdraw from events in Europe, nor could it pursue an
isolationist course. The Truman doctrine, based on the
dual concepts of deterrence and containment, was a
reaction to the civil war in Greece and Turkey’s dispute with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) over the Dardanelles Strait. Truman also instituted the Marshall Plan to rebuild the war torn economies of Europe. In a speech to Congress in March 1948,
Truman emphasized the need for the United States
to address the threats to Europe:
Until the free nations of Europe have regained their
strength, and so long as communism threatens the very
existence of democracy, the United States must remain
strong enough to support those countries of Europe
which are threatened with communist control and policestate rule.6

Recognizing the importance of Europe to the
United States, President Dwight Eisenhower continued the policy of deterrence and containment initiated
by President Truman, as did his successor, President
John Kennedy. In his famous Ich bin ein Berliner speech
in June 1963, President Kennedy declared, “Freedom is
indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not
free.”7 Even though a lot had changed since Truman’s
administration (e.g., the Cuban missile crisis and the
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space race), U.S. interests in Europe remained constant.
In his speech at Independence Hall in Philadelphia the
year before, President Kennedy more clearly outlined
the role of Europe in pursuing U.S. national interests:
We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival
but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the basic
object of our foreign policy for 17 years. We believe that
a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role
in the common defense, of responding more generously
to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United
States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving
problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and
developing coordinated policies in all economic, political,
and diplomatic areas. We see in such a Europe a partner
with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the
great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a
community of free nations.8

Twenty years later, the United States retained its
fundamental commitment to a Europe whole, free, and
at peace. President Ronald Reagan famously called for
Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall in
his speech at the Brandenburg Gate in 1987. His earlier speech at Normandy beach, in commemoration
of D-Day in 1984, emphasized continued U.S. interdependence with, and commitment to, Europe:
We are bound today by what bound us 40 years ago,
the same loyalties, traditions, and beliefs. We’re bound
by reality. The strength of America’s allies is vital to
the United States, and the American security guarantee
is essential to the continued freedom of Europe’s
democracies. We were with you then; we are with you
now. Your hopes are our hopes, and your destiny is our
destiny.9

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the strategic environment abruptly and dramatically changed.
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The USSR, the focus of U.S. security strategy since the
end of World War II, imploded and broke-up. Yet in
spite of the loss of this existential threat, U.S. interests in Europe persisted. Shifts in the global balance
of power enabled the United States to pursue a more
ambitious foreign policy based on expanding democracy and enlarging NATO to promote peace and stability. Despite this dramatic change, President Bill
Clinton’s 1994 National Security Strategy (NSS) painted
a very familiar picture of U.S. interests in Europe:
European stability is vital to our own security, a lesson
we have learned twice at great cost this century. Vibrant
European economies mean more jobs for Americans
at home and investment opportunities abroad. With
the collapse of the Soviet empire and the emergence of
new democracies in its wake, the United States has an
unparalleled opportunity to contribute toward a free and
undivided Europe. Our goal is an integrated democratic
Europe cooperating with the United States to keep the
peace and promote prosperity.10

Al-Qaeda’s attack on the United States again
changed the strategic environment and America’s
approach to foreign policy. President George W. Bush
articulated U.S. willingness, if necessary, to act alone
and protect Americans with preemptive force. Yet,
even after the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the
security of Europe remained an essential U.S. national
interest. In his second and final NSS, President Bush
presented twin pillars of U.S. strategy. The first articulated the desire to promote freedom, justice, and
human dignity. This idealistic approach to security
echoed the liberal school of international relations. The
second pillar emphasized U.S. leadership of a community of democracies to confront the contemporary challenges facing the world.
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Europe is home to some of our oldest and closest allies.
Our cooperative relations are built on a sure foundation
of shared values and interests. This foundation is
expanding and deepening with the ongoing spread of
effective democracies in Europe, and must expand and
deepen still further if we are to reach the goal of a Europe
whole, free, and at peace.11

The two strategies published by President Barack
Obama again signaled a shift in U.S. foreign policy.
Obama clearly took a more cautious and selective
approach to U.S. engagement in crisis management
operations around the globe than did Bush. At the
same time, Obama continued to extol the importance
of Europe to the United States. In his 2015 grand strategy, Obama stated:
The United States maintains a profound commitment to a
Europe that is free, whole, and at peace. A strong Europe
is our indispensable partner, including for tackling global
security challenges, promoting prosperity, and upholding
international norms.12

The NSS published by President Donald Trump
in 2017 represents a different approach to grand strategy. Even though the geostrategic environment and
U.S. approach to the world changed, the U.S. enduring interest in a Europe that was whole and free never
wavered.13 A strong and effective NATO has been and
remains essential to promoting that interest as well as
other vital U.S. interests. NATO and the EU were created in order to promote this vision of a democratic,
peaceful, prosperous, and united Europe. Language in
the current NSS reinforces the importance of NATO in
promoting that vision: “The NATO alliance of free and
sovereign states is one of our great advantages over our
competitors, and the United States remains committed

7

to Article V of the Washington Treaty.”14 Since their
creation, the EU and NATO have been essential to
promoting U.S. interests in Europe and projecting
U.S. instruments of power globally. NATO has been
the primary multilateral mechanism for addressing
security challenges and promoting democratic values
in Europe; the EU has been the key to promoting economic prosperity and common values (democracy) in
the region and adjacent areas. Rather than being relics
of the Cold War, NATO and the EU have adapted to
the changing geostrategic environment. The following
sections examine the roles, functions, and capabilities
of NATO and the EU. It also looks at the resources they
bring to the table and how they have adapted over time
to changes in the global environment.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NATO is one of the most successful alliances in
history. NATO was founded as a traditional military
alliance to deter aggression from the Soviet Union and
to reassure countries in Europe that the United States
had a security commitment to their survival as independent and democratic states. The United States was
directly responsible for the creation of NATO. NATO’s
founding document, the North Atlantic Treaty (known
as the Washington Treaty) was signed in 1949. To this
day, any member wishing to join the Alliance must
still deposit their diplomatic instruments in Washington, DC, before officially joining NATO.
The Alliance was formed out of self-interest. It was
in the interest of the United States to contain the Soviet
Union and to provide security in Europe necessary for
the mutual prosperity and peace of both the United
States and Europe. As such, the Alliance was a tool,
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or way to achieve the survival of U.S. allies in Europe
and to promote the viability and stability of the liberal
international system. In the words of General Lord
Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, NATO was in
Europe’s interest “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”15
Seven decades later, NATO has evolved from a
traditional alliance to a security community. There
is a qualitative distinction between an alliance and a
security community. Historically, an alliance is outwardly focused and rather transitory in nature. As the
balance of power shifted, so too did alliances. Security
communities are different in that they are inwardly
focused and enduring. According to international relations scholars, security communities “develop mutual
images of each other that make the thought of violent conflict (with each other) unthinkable.”16 There
is an element of trust, developed in conjunction with
a common identity, which is established in a security
community. So long as that trust remains, the survival
of the community becomes an objective unto itself.
While NATO is, first and foremost, a collective
defense agreement, it is also a political alliance. “NATO
strives to promote democratic values and encourages
consultation and cooperation on defense and security
issues to build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict.”17 As noted in the 1967 Harmel Report, political
solidarity is just as important as military capability in
deterring aggression.18 One must recall, at its founding, NATO did not have any infrastructure, nor did it
have a common, integrated military structure. Rather,
it was a commitment by the allies—mostly European
democracies, the United States, and Canada—to stand
together in the face of an authoritarian threat to their
common security. Political solidarity, exemplified by
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NATO’s consensus decision-making procedures, was
perhaps the greatest contribution of NATO to U.S. and
European security.
That dual nature as both a political and military
alliance is embodied in two key provisions of the
Washington Treaty: consultations (Article 4) and collective defense (Article 5). First, with regard to Article
4, any ally can convene Article 4 consultations when
it feels threatened. There have been four instances of
such consultations in the post–Cold War period: three
invoked by Turkey over Iraq/Syria and one by Poland
over the Ukraine crisis. Turning to Article 5, an attack
against any member is considered an attack against all
Alliance members. In spite of several significant challenges in NATO’s history, such as the Berlin Crisis
from 1958 to 1962, NATO had never invoked its collective defense provisions under Article 5 until after
the attacks on the United States on 9/11. The first and
only time NATO used the Article 5 declaration was to
demonstrate political solidarity and unity as much as
to signal commitment to defend its ally.19 America’s
post-World War II investment in NATO paid great
dividends in 2001.
The question remains, why has NATO remained in
existence after the end of the Cold War? A traditional
alliance would have disbanded after the common
threat had been vanquished. The answer is that NATO
persists because it has been able to adapt and continue
providing benefits to its member states. In his book,
How NATO Adapts, Seth Johnston attributes NATO’s
survival to its ability to adapt institutionally, in terms
of size, organization, and mission, to changes in the
European and global security environment.20
At its founding, NATO consisted of 12 member
states (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland,
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Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
Between 1949 and 1998, NATO only added four new
members: Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain. These
allies were added because they provided military
value to the Alliance. The end of the Cold War provided a permissive environment for other states to join
the Alliance. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO
expanded from 16 members in 1998 to 29 members
in 2017 (the 16 members already mentioned plus the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro). Many of these states
added little to the collective capabilities of NATO,
but did contribute to advancing the political aim of a
Europe whole, free, and at peace. Nations continue to
find value in the security provided by the Washington
Treaty.
NATO also has demonstrated its ability to change
its organizational structure in response to geopolitical
developments. Two examples demonstrate this organizational flexibility: the empowerment of the Defense
Planning Committee (DPC), and the creation of Allied
Command Transformation. The DPC was established
in 1963 as a decision-making body. It did not start
making a significant contribution until after France left
NATO’s integrated military structure (but remained in
the Alliance) in 1967. The departure of a key member
state, such as France, could have been devastating to
the Alliance. In fact, France also insisted that NATO
Headquarters leave France. The question then became
how the Alliance could continue to seek consensus
with one member only in the political part of NATO.
The DPC provided a solution to this problem. As Seth
Johnston explained:
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[T]he two-tiered political structure . . . in which leaders
met to discuss defense-related issues in the DPC, from
which France abstained participation while all other
issues continued to be addressed in the NAC (North
Atlantic Council).21

The DPC provided a mechanism to keep France
actively involved in NATO’s political discussions,
while allowing the other members to cooperate in
military matters without France. The DPC immediately proved its worth. The DPC provided the political approval to undertake the critical strategy review
in 1967, which lead to the flexible response strategy,
which lasted until the end of the Cold War.22 The DPC
was dissolved by the Alliance in 2010, and its responsibilities were absorbed into the NAC (which will be
discussed later).
The other major organizational adaption concerned
Strategic Command Atlantic (SACLANT). During the
Cold War, SACLANT was designed to protect the vital
trans-Atlantic sea link. This function was viewed as
obsolete with the fall of the Soviet Union. Yet, NATO
wanted to retain a major headquarters in the United
States and to respond better to current and future
challenges and opportunities in the global strategic
environment. Thus, Allied Command Transformation
(ACT) replaced SACLANT in 2003. ACT provided a
formal institution to transform NATO’s organization,
capabilities, and doctrine. It also provided NATO
with another four-start billet when France reentered
the NATO integrated military structure in 2009. With
mechanisms in place to help understand complexity
and allow NATO to adapt quickly in rapidly changing circumstances, ACT stays abreast of developments
regarding artificial intelligence, learning machines,
and enhanced decision-making, and establishes
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partnerships with non-military activities. Thus, ACT
performs an essential role in promoting interoperability through education, training, and exercises,
reducing transaction costs for the United States and
providing the Alliance with focal points to guide cooperation. Current Secretary of Defense General James
Mattis was ACT commander until 2009, and he has
been succeeded by two French general officers. Without NATO’s ACT, the United States would have to
assume these functions, or find another organization
to do so.
Probably the most important adaptation of the
Alliance was the addition of two new core tasks: cooperative security and crisis management. Adding the
mission of cooperative security was an acknowledgment that political and security developments beyond
NATO borders could impact the Alliance, and its
member states. It was also a recognition that NATO
was uniquely positioned to affect stability in the region
and globally. The seeds for cooperative security were
planted as early as 1967 in the Harmel Report mentioned earlier.23 In recognizing that military security
and a relaxation of tensions in Europe could proceed
in tandem, that report set the stage for the cooperative
security role adopted over 20 years later. Since the end
of the Cold War, NATO has pursued cooperative security (including the promotion of security, stability, and
democratic values) through the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council (EAPC).
NATO’s PfP program provides the United States
and its allies with a valuable tool for cooperative security. By promoting interoperability and cooperation
through educational opportunities, training exercises,
and assistance visits, the PfP promotes U.S. and NATO
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values such as maintaining civilian control over the
military, promoting democracy, and protecting human
rights. PfP also increases the utility of these nations to
contribute to existing and future coalition operations.
Today, NATO’s PfP program has 22 partner nations,
including Russia. NATO has various other regional
partner forums that provide information and focal
points for cooperation. These include the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
NATO also created a body to mimic the NAC as
a part of its cooperative security efforts. In 1991, the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was
established to provide a mechanism for security dialogue between NATO and non-NATO partners.24 It
was replaced by the EAPC in 1997. “NATO’s 2010
Strategic Concept [which was approved at the Lisbon
Summit in November 2010] identifies the EAPC and
PfP as central to the Allies’ vision of a Europe whole,
free and at peace.”25 Those programs continue to promote stability, interoperability, and shared NATO
values.
The other major adaption by NATO was the addition of crisis management as a core function. With the
mixed record of the United Nations (UN) and other
organizations in preventing conflict, member states
realized that NATO was uniquely capable of preventing crises from becoming conflicts and resolving those
conflicts once underway. The members of the Alliance
also realized that crisis management could give NATO
a new purpose, an idea that was especially important
to the United States given its global interests beyond
Europe. As U.S. Senator Richard Lugar stated in 1993,
“NATO should either go out of area or out of business.”26 Crisis Management, as NATO would practice
it, was grounded in the liberal school of international
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relations, and sought “the indivisibility of peace” in
the world, especially on NATO’s borders. Not long
after the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO took on its first
crisis management mission: Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Bosnia peacekeeping mission was groundbreaking in that it took place outside of NATO borders.
European states, operating under the UN, had proved
incapable of stemming the violence in the Balkans.
Thus in April 1993, NATO’s first major air operation,
Operation DENY FLIGHT, began to enforce a UNimposed no fly zone in Bosnia established under UN
Security Council Resolution 816.27 A more aggressive
bombing campaign followed, Operation DELIBERATE
FORCE. The United States provided the majority of
aircraft during these air operations. These operations
led to the halting of the civil war and the agreement
of the Dayton Peace Accords. To implement these
accords, the UN approved the NATO Implementation
Force (IFOR) in December 1995 and the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996. Every NATO member
contributed to SFOR, which helped to stabilize the
region. The EU later assumed responsibility to oversee
the Dayton Peace Accords from NATO in 2004, with
the establishment of European Union Force Althea
(EUFOR Althea). Althea continues to keep the peace
today.
NATO’s next crisis management mission was in
Kosovo. In many ways, Kosovo was a riskier operation than Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, the Alliance did
not have UN authorization. Second, domestic opinion
was much more divided on intervention. Finally, the
Kosovo operation took place in the same year NATO
expanded from 16 to 19 members. This expansion was
not only the largest single expansion in NATO history, but also the first one that included three former

15

members of the Warsaw Pact: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. In spite of these challenges and other
frictions, NATO was able to reach consensus to act and
initiated Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999. After 78
days of aerial combat against Serbian forces, an agreement was reached, and the Kosovo Stabilization Force
(KFOR) was created to enforce the peace. All three new
NATO members contributed to KFOR, as did Russia.
The KFOR mission was augmented by an EU rule of
law mission—EULEX—in 2008; and as of this writing,
KFOR and EULEX missions continue to keep the peace
in Kosovo. Thus, in Bosnia and in Kosovo, NATO and
the EU responded to out-of-area crises, thereby contributing to regional stability.
Probably NATO’s most ambitious crisis management operation was undertaken in support of U.S.
operations in Afghanistan. The International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was established by the UN Security Council in December 2001.
NATO took charge of ISAF in August 2003 to support
the Afghan Government in providing security and to
prevent Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist safe
haven.28 ISAF was especially challenging because it
was out of the European region, in a land-locked country with very difficult terrain, over 7,000 kilometers
(km) from Brussels, Belgium. The mission was also
approved at a time of heightened U.S. tension with
France and Germany over the Iraq War. In spite of
these challenges, NATO allies stood by U.S. efforts
to stabilize Afghanistan. “At its height, the force was
more than 130,000 strong, with troops from 51 NATO
and partner nations.”29 Non-U.S. NATO nations contributed around 35,000 of those forces.30 While ISAF
ended in 2014, NATO continues to support a follow-on
mission to Afghanistan, Resolute Support Mission, to
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train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. As of
June 2018, almost 16,000 NATO and partner troops
remain in Afghanistan (of which about half were
U.S. Soldiers).31 While there have been criticisms over
caveats by NATO members and contribution shortfalls over the years, NATO was there to support the
United States. Not only did NATO flags contribute to
a robust coalition, tamping down perceptions of the
United States as “going it alone,” sizeable NATO contingents in Afghanistan enabled the United States to
project power into Iraq during the critical period of
the Iraqi Surge. In Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan,
NATO demonstrated its value to the United States and
its allies in promoting stability globally.
In addition to NATO’s ability to adapt, the Alliance also provides a robust military capability to its
members. NATO nations, excluding the United States,
collectively spent about US$271 billion on defense in
2017.32 The combined military budgets of NATO’s top
four powers alone equaled around US$170 billion in
2017. While much less than that of the United States,
these expenditures exceeded both China’s (US$145 billion) and Russia’s (US$59 billion) defense spending in
2016. That said, NATO allies have been criticized for
not contributing enough to their defense from almost
the very beginning of the Alliance.33
Burden-sharing debates often inform the discussions of NATO’s relevance. In the 1970s, the Mansfield amendments threatened to reduce U.S. troops
on the continent dramatically, if Europe did not pay
more for its own defense.34 In 2016, President Obama
described the NATO allies as often being complacent
about their own defense.35 President Trump has also
criticized defense contributions by NATO members
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and increased the pressure on allies at the May 2017
mini-summit.
NATO members must finally contribute their fair share
and meet their financial obligations, for 23 of the 28
member nations are still not paying what they should be
paying and what they’re supposed to be paying for their
defense.36

However, the burden-sharing issue is more nuanced
than often acknowledged.
Both U.S. and NATO spending fell as a percentage
of gross domestic product (GDP) following 1991, with
U.S. spending falling at a greater rate than Europe’s
until 9/11.37 While U.S. expenditures increased after
the al-Qaeda attacks, defense spending in other NATO
members continued the gradual decline. As of 2016,
only five NATO countries met the 2-percent goal: the
United States, Greece, the United Kingdom, Estonia,
and Poland. The new U.S. Secretary of Defense echoed
concern over declining NATO spending in early 2017:
America will meet its responsibilities, but if your nations
do not want to see America moderate its commitment
to the alliance, each of your capitals needs to show its
support for our common defense.38

Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson also called
for NATO allies to establish a timeline for meeting
this 2-percent commitment by 2024, as pledged at the
Lisbon Summit.39 Leading up to the NATO summit in
July 2018, President Trump sent letters to individual
NATO leaders to encourage them to meet the 2-percent
target. “It will, however, become increasingly difficult
to justify to American citizens why some countries continue to fail to meet our shared collective security commitments.”40 While Trump’s statements about NATO
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have been inconsistent, at one time critical and another
supportive, he has consistently pointed to a direct
relationship between European defense spending and
NATO relevance and U.S. support of the Alliance.
In spite of this criticism, it appears that NATO has
turned a corner on declining defense expenditures.
The trend toward increased defense spending by
America’s NATO allies began well before President
Trump’s inauguration with the Russian invasion and
annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2017, non-U.S. NATO
expenditures showed a 4.87-percent increase from 2016
(the third year in a row of increasing defense expenditures) and 11 members (12 including the United States)
met the equally important target of 20 percent or more
of defense expenditures on equipment.41 In 2017,
Romania came close to meeting the target at 1.8 percent
of GDP, and Latvia and Lithuania have also greatly
increased their defense spending, pledging to meet
the 2-percent target by 2018.42 In addition, Canada
committed to increasing its defense expenditures by
70 percent over the next 10 years.43 More importantly,
Germany, one of Europe’s largest and wealthiest states,
made a commitment to increase its contributions. In
its white paper published in July 2016, Germany
pledged to meet the NATO target gradually.44 However, in spite of significant planned increases in defense
expenditures, from €38.9 billion in 2018 to €43.9 billion,
Germany will not meet the 2-percent level even by
2022, partially due to a growing German economy.45
Many argue that this discussion is misguided and
that the 2-percent target is rather arbitrary and does
not necessarily reflect the needs of the Alliance. In a
2016 article, Alexander Mattelaer made a compelling
case that NATO should focus on capabilities required
to meet contemporary challenges and establish a
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division of labor within the Alliance.46 Burden-sharing
arguments also overlook the fact that allies contribute
a much larger part of NATO common funding than
does the United States. The United States provides
only 21.7 percent of the civilian budget, 22.5 percent
of the military budget, and 21.7 percent of the investment budget.47 Therefore, the issue of burden sharing
is more nuanced than the discussion over the 2-percent target implies, and national security professionals
should have a nuanced understanding when considering NATO relevance.
NATO forces have also been criticized for a lack of
capability. According to data from the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, “active personnel totals
across key NATO European members France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom fell from about
1.3 million in 1996 to around 716,000 in 2016.”48 While
the Alliance has endured a quantitative reduction in
capability, it has also suffered a qualitative degradation. A 2016 Parameters article captures this limitation:
Not all NATO forces are equipped for engagements in
which light armored vehicles are vulnerable to massive,
intense fire strikes and in which cyber and electronic
warfare plays a central role in affecting command and
control.49

NATO also lacks many of the key enablers such as
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, air
refueling, and airlift capabilities. These shortcomings
are more important concerns than levels of defense
expenditures. In this area too, it appears that NATO is
making progress.
Thanks to Russian aggression in Ukraine, NATO
has made some strides toward increasing its capabilities since the Wales Summit in 2014. For example,
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NATO increased the size of the NATO Response Force
to 40,000 and established a 5,000 person Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force, significantly reducing
NATO’s response time, and increasing capability.50
At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO declared
Initial Operational Capability of the NATO ballistic
missile defense system, designed to shield Alliance
countries from attacks from outside the Euro-Atlantic
area. “This means that the US ships based in Spain, the
radar in Turkey, and the interceptor site in Romania
are now able to work together under NATO command
and NATO control.”51 After the summit, the Alliance
increased its ability to deter Russian aggression by
increasing its forward presence.52 These capabilities
point to another benefit of NATO—its ability to coordinate and facilitate collective efforts on the part of the
allies. For example, the framework nation concept provides Alliance members with a mechanism to promote
multinational capability development that would be
more costly, if even possible, for individual states.
In addition to member capabilities, NATO, as an
organization, provides significant functional benefits
to the United States. The NAC is the principal decision-making body within the Alliance. Having the
imprimatur of the NAC lends legitimacy to NATO
operations, especially in the absence of a UN mandate,
as in the air operations in Kosovo. NATO also has a
Nuclear Planning Group to coordinate nuclear policy
within the Alliance. The NATO Secretary General, the
International Staff, the International Military Staff, and
the various NATO committees also provide significant
functional benefits to its members. Like other international institutions, they provide information, enhance
cooperation, provide focal points, and monitor capabilities and contributions made by member states.53

21

NATO’s integrated military structure also provides
benefits to the United States.
Under heavy U.S. influence, NATO’s integrated
military structure provides a stable and reliable command and control backbone, allowing the Alliance to
implement political decisions effectively to America’s
advantage. In addition to the military efficiencies of
this standing structure, it also yields a political benefit
of projecting solidarity and commitment to potential
adversaries and partners. The Military Committee is
the senior military authority within the Alliance, while
the uniformed forces come under the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). SHAPE’s
role is to “prepare, plan, conduct and execute NATO
military operations, missions and tasks in order to
achieve the strategic objectives of the Alliance.”54
The Supreme Allied Commander Europe is the commander of SHAPE, and from NATO’s inception, it has
been an American also dual-hatted as the U.S. European Command Commander.55 This position gives
the United States additional leverage and influence in
shaping actions and attitudes of Alliance members and
NATO itself. In addition to these organizational benefits, NATO also brings a great deal of potential power
to the table.
The Alliance is also often viewed as a resource for
U.S. operations. NATO is currently an alliance of 29
members, over 936 million people, and a combined
GDP of NATO members exceeds US$41.5 trillion
in 2018.56 With few permanently assigned personnel, NATO relies upon national troop contributions.
NATO has about 1.8 million European troops (over 3.1
million including Canada and the United States) and
an impressive array of advanced military capabilities.57
NATO promotes interoperability and standardization
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of Alliance and partner forces. Despite the aforementioned concerns about capability shortfalls, these forces
are capable contributors to NATO operations and U.S.led coalitions.
Finally, it should be noted that NATO provides
operating bases for the United States to project power
within Europe and outside of the region. For example, the Air Force has major bases in Germany, Italy,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom, while the U.S. Navy
has bases in Greece, Italy, and Spain. These bases, over
4,600 miles from the United States, give America’s military tremendous reach and sustainability. Thus, NATO
enhances U.S. diplomatic and military instruments of
power in pursuit of both Alliance and U.S. interests
worldwide. In sum, NATO enhances the ability of the
United States to deter, defend, and to promote stability in Europe and beyond. Perhaps less apparent is the
role that the EU plays in promoting U.S. interests.
THE EUROPEAN UNION
The EU is considered by academics as a sui generis
international organization. It has been described as a
supranational organization, a regional organization,
and an economic community. However the EU is categorized, it is undoubtedly an economic powerhouse,
representing over 22 percent of global GDP.58 The EU
is also the United States and the world’s largest trading
partner and the largest source and recipient of foreign
direct investment.
While indirectly supported by the United States,
the development of the EU was an internal effort on
the part of European nations. The movement toward
greater cooperation began with the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, which committed key European allies to
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mutual defense of each other in the face of an attack.59
Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands were signatures to this treaty. This treaty, which
later formed the basis of the Western European Union
(WEU), not only met European security needs in the
face of an increasingly hostile Soviet Union, it also
demonstrated a willingness by key allies to share the
burdens of defense. While security concerns were the
initial impetus for European cooperation, the seeds of
the EU were planted in the economic sphere and that is
where, perhaps arguably, the greatest relevance to the
United States lies. Like NATO, the EU evolved over
time in response to changes in the international environment, in terms of size, organization, and mission.
The first major step to promote formally both the
economic and security goals of Europe was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established
by the Treaty of Paris in 1951. The ECSC included all
countries of the Brussels Treaty, with the exception of
Britain. More importantly, the ECSC included former
combatants West Germany and Italy. The organization’s roles and functions evolved over time, leading
to even greater cooperation and interdependence. The
1957 Treaty of Rome expanded the remit of the ECSC
by creating a European Economic Community (EEC),
eventually leading to creation of a common market. All
these efforts helped promote economic development
in Europe and the continued survival and vibrancy of
U.S. allies facing down the Warsaw Pact.
At its founding, the ECSC, a forerunner of the EU,
consisted of six member states (France, West Germany,
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg).
Between 1952 and 2004, the EEC (and its predecessor)
only added six new members: Denmark, Ireland, and
the United Kingdom in 1973, and Greece, Portugal, and
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Spain in the 1980s. Again, the fall of the Soviet Union
opened the possibility of even greater expansion. Like
NATO, the EU expanded from 12 members in 1995
to 28 members in 2013 (member states already mentioned plus Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and
Sweden). Many more nations would like to join the EU
in order to share in its economic prosperity and solidarity. In addition to enlargement, the EU has undergone many organizational changes. This monograph
will focus on those changes after the fall of the Soviet
Union.
The post-Cold War Maastricht Treaty (1992) formally created the EU and gave it much greater authority than the EEC. The EU represented the culmination
of those initial efforts to promote peace and prosperity
in Europe. Under Maastricht, a three-pillar system was
established covering different issue areas with varying levels of cooperation and delegation of authority:
economic matters, foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs. The highest levels of delegation
took place in the economic and justice pillars. Under
Maastricht, the EEC became the European Community
(EC). A subset of the EC was committed to creating
a common currency, the euro. Within the Eurozone,
states delegated monetary policy to the European Central Bank and surrendered their national currencies.
In return, the EU sought to promote economic growth
and convergence, and allow member states to compete
better in the international marketplace.
The Amsterdam Treaty in 1998 established the
Office of the High Representative for Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP), a position somewhere
between a Secretary of State and a Secretary of Defense.
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The Treaty of Lisbon subsequently created the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is the EU’s
diplomatic corps. The EEAS works for the High Representative to carry out the CSFP, which deals with the
external security concerns emanating from terrorism.
The EU produced its first European Security Strategy in
2003 to guide the CSFP, and it published a more outwardly focused security strategy in June 2016. Among
other changes, the new Global Strategy for Foreign and
Security Policy calls for the EU to develop strategic
autonomy.60 These developments have enhanced the
capabilities the EU can bring to addressing those collective action problems discussed earlier, problems
usually affecting American interests.
With these changes mentioned earlier, the EU has
developed the capability to conduct crisis management operations in Europe and around the world. The
roots of this capability lay with the WEU and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), created to
deal with low-level security issues facing post-Cold
War Europe.61 The 1998 St. Malo Declaration, between
France and the United Kingdom led to the renaming of ESDP as the CSFP, and the transfer of responsibility to the EU, an arrangement codified under the
Lisbon Treaty in 2007. Under today’s CSFP, the EU has
undertaken a very active role in crisis management
operations. The CSFP allows member states to coordinate foreign policy and leverage a unique whole-ofgovernment approach that is greater than the sum of
its parts. Its diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement,
and economic instruments of power will be essential in
addressing migration and extremism.
The CSFP allows EU member states to conduct missions not only in Europe, but out of area as well. These
missions help to promote regional stability (a U.S.
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interest) and enable the United States and NATO to
focus on other security matters. Since 2003, the EU has
completed some 18 missions, mostly in Africa (10) and
Europe (5).62 Eleven of these were civilian missions and
six were military missions, reflecting the EU’s comparative advantage in providing a whole-of-government
approach. As of June 2018, the EU had 16 active missions, again concentrated near Africa (8), Europe (6),
and the Middle East (3). Ten of these were civilian missions and six were military missions.63 In 2016, European nations had over 12,000 troops deployed as part
of either EU or NATO missions. Even more troops were
provided to support the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe and UN missions worldwide.64
There is even a mechanism for the EU to conduct operations using NATO assets when the Alliance does not
wish to get involved directly. Thus, in cooperation
with NATO, the EU enhances the development of a
“‘comprehensive approach’ to crisis management and
operations.”65 These missions help to promote stability
and relieve the United States and NATO of potential
burdens. All of this makes the EU quite relevant to U.S.
foreign policy.
Like NATO, the EU has a mutual defense clause.
Unlike NATO, the United States is not a member.
This clause was introduced as a part of the Treaty of
Lisbon, under Article 42(7). The article stipulates, “if
an EU country is the victim of armed aggression on
its territory, the other EU countries have an obligation
to aid and assist it by all the means in their power.”66
In November 2015, French President François Hollande invoked the EU treaty’s self-defense clause in
the aftermath of terrorist attacks in Paris. This was the
first time that this article had been invoked, and like
the activation of Article 5 after 9/11, it was activated in
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response to a terrorist attack. This defense clause gives
EU members an additional venue to pursue security
cooperation in the face of contemporary threats. The
Treaty of Lisbon also created a mechanism to facilitate
cooperation and collaboration within the union called
permanent structured cooperation. This includes participation in the European Defense Agency and the
commitment to attain certain capabilities and readiness levels in support of the CSFP.67 Should the United
States distance itself from NATO, the self-defense
clause could take on added importance, as a venue
for European defense cooperation without the United
States having a formal voice as a member state.
Ironically, Brexit has renewed interest in further
security integration among the remaining EU members. The EU’s 2016 Summit explored creating a dedicated border control force, improving EU battlegroups,
and loosening EU common funding rules for Common
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) operations.68 In the
2 years since the summit, the CSDP program advanced
more than in the previous 2 decades. This was largely
due to two initiatives: permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund (EDF).
The Lisbon Treaty set the stage for PESCO in 2007.
Under PESCO, EU member states can pursue further
cooperation on the development and procurement of
equipment as long as at least three member states are
involved. Unlike previous efforts, PESCO establishes
binding commitments upon the nations. As of 2018,
25 of 28 members had signed up for PESCO (Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia,
Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden). In addition to providing
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the modalities for enhanced cooperation, the EU is
also providing funding for research and development
for PESCO projects in conjunction with the EDA. The
goal is to reduce the number of individually produced
military systems and increase the efficiency of scarce
funds devoted to defense. In addition to PESCO, the
EU has established the EDF (with up to €5.5 billion per
year after 2020) to help pay for the costs of research
and development.69 These initiatives harken back to
the European Defense Capability discussed earlier and
terminated in 1954. In fact, some European nations
have expressed support for a European Defense Union.
“Germany has declared it will support the creation of
a permanent civil–military operational headquarters
within the Brussels-based security and defense structures.”70 It has also suggested a major harmonization
of national defense industries.
There are some concerns that these efforts might
divert scarce resources from operational capabilities
to fund redundant headquarters and staffs.71 On the
other hand, a European Defense Union might also
deepen EU military cooperation and motivate member
countries to develop greater capabilities and avoid
unnecessary duplication, thus fulfilling their ambition for some strategy autonomy and the U.S. desire
for greater burden sharing efforts. If the Europeans
come to see the United States as more of a competitor than trusted partner, EU defense efforts could lead
to a security arrangement that de-emphasizes NATO,
while excluding the United States. As a partner that
shares many U.S. interests and values, the EU also
provides the significant economic heft in pursuit of
common goals. The EU had an estimated combined
GDP of US$19.7 trillion in 2018 and the Euro area had
a combined GDP of US$14.3 trillion.72 While Brexit will
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certainly weaken the EU’s collective economic heft, the
EU will still have a population of 444 million, and a
US$16.7-trillion economy after Britain leaves. The EU
is the world’s largest trading bloc and largest source
and destination for foreign direct investment.73 The EU
is also the largest trading and investment partner of the
United States. In addition, the EU is the largest contributor to the UN’s operating budget and funds about 40
percent of UN peacekeeping operations.74 Finally, the
EU is also the largest provider of Official Development
Assistance in the world. All this means the EU exerts
a great deal of leverage with regard to the economic
instrument of power. The EU gives the United States
a partner to address collective action problems such as
the support of the global economic system, the proliferation of WMD, the promotion of international stability, the maintenance of the global international system,
the mitigation of climate change, and the continuance
of productive relations with both China and Russia.
The EU offers a robust diplomatic capability that
can benefit the United States when employed in the
pursuit of common interests. With 139 delegations
worldwide, the EEAS has been a major player in negotiations over the Arctic, Syria, Iran, and North Korea,
as well as other concerns, such as energy issues, climate change, human rights, and even the Middle East
Peace Process. Of course, EEAS efforts do not supersede the diplomatic efforts of individual EU member
states. For example, in February 2015, the leaders of
France and Germany negotiated the Minsk II agreement with Russia to stop the fighting in Ukraine and
establish a framework for resolving the conflict. The
EU also has a mechanism, the European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP), for promoting cooperative security, similar to NATO’s PfP program. Under the new European
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Security Strategy, the ENP is focused on promoting
resilience and better governance with its partners, contributing to international stability. The benefits of the
EU’s capabilities for U.S. policymakers may be indirect, but it seems better for the EU to see the United
States as a valued partner in their diplomatic endeavors than as a rival.
GRAND STRATEGIES
Having reviewed the roles, functions, and capabilities of NATO and the EU, it is now necessary to
look at U.S. grand strategy. A grand strategy is “the
art of reconciling ends and means.”75 In other words,
it links what the United States is trying to accomplish
with how it goes about getting there. A grand strategy
implies a purposeful pursuit of U.S. national interests
by defining objectives, ways, and means.76 The United
States has pursued various grand strategies since its
founding, and past presidents have typically mixed
elements of the four traditional grand strategies to fit
the circumstances of their times. Since the end of the
Cold War, U.S. foreign policy has tilted slightly toward
one approach or another, while always maintaining
elements of other grand strategies. In fact, the United
States has been largely consistent in its definition of
and pursuit of national interests over time.
In 2016, the RAND Corporation published a study
examining the global liberal international order, and
four potential approaches to U.S. grand strategy:
retaking the offensive, selective engagement/retrenchment, offshore balancing, and zero sum.77 Ideally, the
grand strategy would guide U.S. foreign policy. If the
administration believes that the liberal international
order has benefited the United States, then they should
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pursue retaking the offensive, or selective engagement.
If Trump believes that this order has not benefited the
Unites States or has led to exploitation by others, then
offshore balancing or zero-sum strategies would be
the best course. Whatever direction the administration takes, U.S. grand strategy will determine which
national interests to pursue and how relevant the
EU and NATO are to promoting or impeding those
interests.
The RAND study modifies a typology found in a
classic article by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visons for U.S. Grand Strategy,” published in
1997.78 That article sought to help guide the strategy
of the Clinton administration as it entered its second
term. It also outlined four competing visions of U.S.
grand strategy: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. This monograph will use these categories of U.S. grand strategy
to further analyze the relevance of the EU and NATO
in the pursuit of U.S. national interests.79 It also compares each of these grand strategies to trends in President Trump’s foreign policy.
Neo-Isolationism
Perhaps the grand strategy that most closely aligns
with the rhetoric of the current administration is
neo-isolationism. This is what the RAND study called
the zero-sum strategy. Defensive realism is the intellectual underpinning of neo-isolationism. Stephen Walt, a
distinguished scholar at the Harvard Kennedy School,
argues that realism “depicts international affairs as a
struggle for power among self-interested states and is
generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war.”80 In order to survive, states have
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to focus on relative gains. Thus, if others gain more
than the United States by cooperation, this threatens
U.S. security; in other words, the international system
is a zero-sum game.
In many ways, the America First policy resembles a grand strategy of Isolationism.81 The policy
rests on the premise that the international system and
U.S. allies have taken advantage of the United States,
which threatens U.S. security. Early in his administration, Trump scrapped the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a
major element in the rebalance strategy to Asia. The
United States also announced a major renegotiation of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. In
2018, the United States imposed tariffs on washing
machines and solar energy cells from China and South
Korea, followed by tariffs on steel and aluminum
imports from Canada, China, the EU, and Mexico.
This zero-sum approach to trade has upset allies and
non-allies alike. During his campaign, Trump had
previously labeled NATO as obsolete, though he later
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the Alliance. Since
the election, the administration has pursued tighter
controls on immigration, with a 2017 budget request
that increases funding for immigration and border
control. The President also withdrew the United States
from the Paris Climate Agreement and the Joint Plan
of Action (JPOA), the agreement to limit and monitor
Iran’s nuclear program. In his America First approach
to U.S. policy, Trump has signaled a new approach to
these challenges, including a hesitance to entangle the
United States in global issues not directly impacting its
core national interests. These moves are all consistent
with neo-isolationism.
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Under a grand strategy of isolationism, the focus
would be on promoting a very narrow set of core U.S.
interests. The United States would aim to reduce hostility and minimize balancing behavior against it by
minding its own business in global affairs. The ultimate
objective of this approach would be to preserve the
global status quo and to avoid foreign entanglements.
This grand strategy would also seek to husband scarce
U.S. resources. It would also adopt a neo-mercantilist
trade policy, meaning the United States would only
pursue trade deals in which the United States gained
more than its trading partners. This would lead to an
increase in barriers to free trade; in other words, the
focus would be on relative gains.82
The germane point for this monograph is the
impact of neo-isolationism on the nature of U.S. relations with the EU and NATO. This approach to grand
strategy would make the EU a competitor to the United
States; the EU would therefore continue to be relevant,
but not necessarily promote U.S. economic interests. In
January 2017, the EU Trade Commissioner cautioned,
“if rising protectionism from elsewhere [read U.S.] is
a threat to the Chinese economy, we (EU and China)
stand ready to engage and fight against it together.”83
This is a credible risk because, after the United States,
China is the EU’s second largest trading partner.
This grand strategy would also render NATO
obsolete or at least seek to extract greater contributions
or side payments from NATO allies.84 There is clear
evidence for the latter. The administration has consistently called for greater contributions on behalf of
NATO (e.g., in combating terrorism) and its member
states (e.g., meeting the 2 percent of GDP norm for
military expenditures). However, there are also indications that the President questions the relevance of
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NATO and that he feels that allies have taken advantage of the United States.
Since it is impossible to withdraw from a globalized
world, a neo-isolationist grand strategy entails significant risks. First, the United States would probably
become less secure as threats multiplied globally. As
Trotsky is alleged to have said, “you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”85 Second,
a neo-isolationist grand strategy would undermine
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and probably lead
to the proliferation of WMD. While Germany, South
Korea, and Japan might be responsible nuclear powers,
other countries might not be so prudent. With the withdrawal of U.S. active leadership, it is also likely that
the international institutional framework the United
States helped to establish (e.g., the UN, International
Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the World Trade
Organization) would collapse. Finally, viewing the EU
only as a competitor and restricting trade with Europe
would make both the United States and its allies less
prosperous.
The risks to the United States in a weakened NATO
are even greater. Many Europeans were alarmed at
Trump’s omission of an overt commitment to Article 5
in the May 2017 NATO mini-summit. As NATO allies
lose faith in U.S. commitment to NATO, they may seek
other institutional or bilateral security arrangements.
In a speech shortly after the mini-summit, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that Europeans could
no longer rely upon others and stated that Europeans
“really must take our fate into our own hands.”86 This
could mean a renewed European defense commitment
under the EU, or a shift to more coalitions among willing European members. In either case, it would reflect
a loss of U.S. influence over European allies.
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At the end of the day, NATO membership does not
cost the United States that much. According to the 2016
NATO Secretary General’s Annual Report, the NATO
common funding budget equaled about US$2.3 billion,
of which the United States contributed about US$513
million.87 This is a small cost in relation to a defense
budget of about US$700 billion in 2018. While pressuring allies to fulfill their commitments to defense is
justified, abandoning or weakening NATO would be
harmful to both the United States and its allies. Not
only would the United States thus sacrifice a great deal
capability and global influence, but also it would have
a difficult time trying to reconstruct these institutions
later on if it decided to change course.
Selective Engagement
Balance of power realism is the intellectual underpinning of selective engagement. It agrees with the
assumptions of realism discussed under neo-isolationism. It also agrees that U.S. power is finite and should
be preserved. Selective engagement is also concerned
about foreign entanglements since they could lead to
balancing behavior against the United States, or lead
to great power conflict. Where it differs from isolationism is that it views the liberal international order
as beneficial for the United States.88 Former-President
Obama’s grand strategy matches most closely selective engagement, with its emphasis on multilateralism.89 Obama significantly reduced the U.S. presence
in Afghanistan and withdrew most U.S. forces from
Iraq. While Obama intervened in Libya, under the auspices of NATO (leading from behind), he declined to
intervene directly in the Syrian civil war other than to
call for regime change, target the Islamic State of Iraq
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and Syria (ISIS), and provide limited support to certain
rebel forces.
President Trump has also shown some indications
of a selective engagement approach. He has made a
concerted effort to maintain peaceful, if not friendly,
relations with both China and Russia, the two great
powers. In the May 2017 NATO mini-summit, President Trump urged the allies to pursue a “greater
focus on terrorism and immigration.”90 Trump also
announced his intention to have a summit with Vladimir Putin after the 2018 NATO Summit. While he
made defeating ISIS one of his top priorities, Trump
has been very skeptical of getting the United States
more involved in other problems in the Middle East.91
Trump has also downplayed the promotion of liberal
democratic values and sought to promote better ties
with Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The administration’s policy on nuclear proliferation could also be
seen as consistent with selective engagement. In 2017,
Trump took a strong stand against North Korea, indicating a potential willingness to use force to prevent
further nuclear proliferation. However, he followed
that with a summit with the North Korean dictator in
April 2018 to pursue peaceful denuclearization. Yet,
Trump has pursued some initiatives that run counter to
the traditional selective engagement approach. Rather
than reduce military expenditures, Trump requested
a significant increase in the U.S. defense budget.92
Also, the United States is still involved in the wars in
Afghanistan and Syria.
Under a grand strategy of selective engagement, the
focus would be on promoting a slightly broader set of
U.S. interests than under isolationism. The objectives
of selective engagement would be to prevent a major
war with China or Russia and to maintain the current
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global balance of power. Key to this approach would
be to husband scarce resources, as in neo-isolationism.
Cooperation with international institutions and allies
would be essential to maintain peace between the
great powers, to limit the proliferation of WMD, and
to address issues that could directly impact the global
balance of power. Thus, the United States would support a robust collective defense capability and a strong
nuclear deterrent that would extend to its NATO
allies. Crisis management operations would be limited
to protect scarce means. Selective engagement would
signal a continuance of U.S. liberal economic trading
policies, with a focus on absolute versus relative gains.
Thus, the EU would be both an economic competitor
and a major trading and security partner. The United
States would remain committed to NATO, but would
shift its focus back to Article 5 and collective defense.
Under selective engagement, prudence would dictate
abandoning any hopes for Georgia and Ukraine to join
the Alliance in the foreseeable future.
As with isolationism, this grand strategy would
entail risks. As Posen and Ross noted 20 years ago, this
grand strategy lacks an ideological appeal.93 Holding
the line is not a very inspirational theme. Esteem for
the United States would also probably diminish with
a less active role in crisis management. Syria is a good
example of the likely reaction if the United States were
to allow other actors, such as China, Iran, and Russia,
to dictate the outcome of local struggles. Even when
the United States decided to intervene, it would likely
do so with limited means. Therefore, unintended
outcomes would be harder to contain, as in Libya
after 2011.
The risks of selective engagement would make the
EU and NATO even more important to U.S. national
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interests. Those organizations would help to share the
burdens of crisis management and deterrence with the
United States and provide a greater veneer of legitimacy during crisis management operations. Trump’s
emphasis on NATO members paying “their fair share”
of security costs in Europe is consistent with an overarching grand strategy of selective engagement. Certainly, the EU’s diplomatic and economic weight and
NATO’s military power and interoperability would
be an asset in sharing the burdens under this grand
strategy.
Terrorism, one of Trump’s priorities, is one area
where both NATO and the EU can contribute under a
strategy of selective engagement. The day after 9/11,
NATO invoked Article 5 in response to the terrorist
attacks.94 On October 26, 2001, NATO also initiated
Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR to detect and deter
terrorist activity and illegal trafficking. NATO has also
been a major contributor to counterterrorist operations
in Afghanistan since 2003, and after meeting in May
2017, NATO has also joined the coalition against ISIS.
The EU has also contributed capabilities to the
counterterrorism effort. In addition to supporting
operations in Afghanistan with development aid and
an EU police training mission, the EU has also developed capabilities to improve cooperation in combating
terrorism. In 2016, the EU established the European
Counter Terrorism Center, to enhance counterterrorism intelligence collection and to provide operational
support to member states.95 That effort has born some
fruit with an increase in information exchange and
operational support. Clearly, NATO and the EU would
be highly relevant as a rival and as a partner under a
grand strategy of selective engagement.

39

Cooperative Security
Cooperative security is firmly grounded in the
international relations tradition of liberalism. In
their seminal article, “The Promise of Institutionalist
Theory,” scholars Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin
lay out the intellectual framework that counters the
realist underpinnings of the other grand strategies.96
While they accept that states are instrumental and selfinterested, they are more optimistic about the prospects for cooperation. States cooperate when they gain
more than the costs involved. Institutions like NATO
and the EU often provide synergistic effects where the
whole is greater than its parts. Similarly, liberal theory
focuses more on absolute gains than relative gains; in
other words, cooperative security is a positive sum
game. “The most important distinguishing feature of
cooperative security is the proposition that peace is
effectively indivisible.”97 Thus, conflict anywhere is a
problem everywhere. This leads to a broader view of
national interests and a more active role globally.
The continuation of NATO enlargement under
Trump, with the recent addition of Montenegro in
May 2017, is something that you might expect under
cooperative security. However, there is very little indication that Trump is inclined to follow a cooperative
security grand strategy more broadly. Perhaps the best
example of a cooperative security approach to grand
strategy was the Clinton administration.98 Under a
grand strategy of cooperative security, the key objectives would be to promote greater international interdependence, to promote democracy, and to pursue
global stability. This grand strategy would emphasize cooperation among the great powers, especially
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with the EU and other allies like Japan, to engage with
China and Russia.
In practice, this grand strategy would treat NATO
more as a partner, and because it espouses a more
interconnected worldview, would call for more frequent crisis management and humanitarian operations. It would also seek to prevent the proliferation
of WMD. Perhaps more than any other grand strategy, cooperative security would rely heavily upon
the cooperation of both the EU and NATO. Arrangements like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) would help strengthen U.S. ties
with Europe and increase their mutual prosperity. The
United States would encourage NATO to expand its
crisis management and cooperative security efforts,
as well as to continue NATO expansion. NATO and
the EU’s partnership and neighborhood programs
would also be essential to spreading democracy where
countries are willing to embrace the rule of law and
democratic values. The PfP, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and Mediterranean dialogue would all be key
instruments for cooperative security. The EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) would complement
these efforts by promoting political association and
economic interdependence where conflict might arise.
Cooperative security would also support greater EU
strategic autonomy in order to increase European military capabilities.
Perhaps the greatest risk of this grand strategy
would be resource exhaustion and declining support
for U.S. involvement abroad. In fact, it could result in
an isolationist backlash as costs in human lives and
treasure mounted. There is also the risk that this would
exacerbate burden-sharing issues within the NATO
Alliance, leading to further resentment on both sides of
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the Atlantic. In addition to these risks, it would be very
difficult to pursue a cooperative security grand strategy without the support of both the EU and NATO.
The collective diplomatic and economic weight of
the United States and Europe would be necessary, as
would NATO’s military capabilities.
As mentioned earlier, there is little indication that
Trump will pursue a grand strategy of cooperative
security. He has made disparaging remarks about the
EU, for example, saying the EU was “possibly just as
bad as China” on trade.99 He has vigorously sought to
renegotiate traditional trade agreements like NAFTA.
Trump has also indicated a disdain for an activist role
for the United States in regional conflicts outside of
defeating ISIS. The administration also withdrew the
United States from the Paris Climate Accords, saying
that it hurt U.S. economic interests and was unfair, and
unilaterally pulled out of the JPOA on Iran’s nuclear
program. So, to some degree, it seems likely there will
be continued tension between the United States and
our long-standing European allies, and perhaps more
competition in the future.
Primacy
Like neo-isolationism and selective engagement,
primacy is based on the principles of realism. More
precisely, primacy is based on the tenets of offensive
realism, outlined by John Mearsheimer, distinguished
scholar at the University of Chicago, in his book, The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics.100 Under offensive realism, great powers are always looking for ways to gain
power at the expense of others. Therefore, they are
driven by the pursuit of relative gains to become more
and more powerful, which ironically could lead to
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them being less secure. Unlike selective engagement,
it is insufficient to maintain the international balance
of power. The objective of primacy is U.S. domination
along the entire spectrum of power (i.e., diplomatic,
intelligence, military, and economic). Hal Brands, Peter
Feaver, William Inboden, and Paul D. Miller argue in a
2017 study that the United States has pursued a:
consistent and successful global strategy that has aimed
to perpetuate American international primacy, to solidify
and extend the liberal international order, and to avert
the emergence of new or resurgent threats to that order.101

While leaning more toward selective engagement
and isolationism, Trump has pursued some policies
that are consistent with a grand strategy of primacy.
He has been very vocal in confronting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially in regards to North
Korea. Prior to the June 2018 summit in Singapore with
North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un, Trump had indicated a willingness to act unilaterally, if necessary, in
dealing with North Korea. In an interview with the
Financial Times, the President stated, “If China is not
going to solve North Korea, we will.”102 The administration’s increased investment in the military is also
consistent with primacy.
Under a grand strategy of primacy, the key objectives
would be to preserve American hegemony, to prevent
the emergence of a peer-competitor, and to protect the
political, security, and economic interests of developed
countries (e.g., Europe) so that they would acquiesce
to U.S. primacy. This grand strategy would emphasize
the containment of other great powers, such as China
and Russia, but also discourage greater autonomy of
allies like Japan and Germany. Primacy would mean
a robust U.S. military presence in NATO and more
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frequent crisis management and humanitarian operations. Like cooperative security, it would also seek to
prevent the proliferation of WMD. A grand strategy of
primacy would seek to expand and strengthen NATO,
but would be leery of any European Defense Union.
Therefore, the United States would support continued
CSFP interventions, but would not support EU efforts
to achieve strategic autonomy. As long as the EU
focused on low-level conflict and crisis management,
such as humanitarian intervention, primacy would
support cooperation with the EU. The United States
might seek a division of labor where NATO focused
on high-end crisis management operations, and the
EU focused on lower end operations. Under primacy,
the United States would also pursue continued NATO
and EU expansion. Like cooperative security, primacy
might support TTIP, but the United States would be
more focused on ensuring that U.S. gains outweighed
those of Europe. Primacy would also support continuing both NATO and EU partnership programs.
Perhaps the greatest risk of this grand strategy
would be the emergence of a rival power. China and
Russia would be the most likely candidates for military rivals, while China, the EU, or Japan could
become economic rivals and challenge U.S. leadership of the global economy. China’s naval exercises
with Russia off the coast of Kaliningrad in July 2017
demonstrate the need to act collectively with European
allies. Another risk is that indiscriminate use of force
and the unilateral approach of a grand strategy of primacy might increase balancing behavior of both rivals
and allies alike. The French and German resistance to
the Iraq invasion is one example of this type of balancing behavior by allies. French, German, and British
support for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,
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led by China, might be another example.103 Even more
so than in cooperative security, resource exhaustion
and declining domestic and international support for
U.S. involvement abroad would be another major risk
of pursuing primacy. Acknowledging the possibility
of friction, cooperation with both the EU and NATO
would be essential to mitigating all of these risks.
RECOMMENDATIONS
There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies,
and that is fighting without them!104
—Winston S. Churchill

No matter what grand strategy (or combination
thereof) the United States pursues, NATO and the EU
are very likely to be vital to American efforts to deter
Russia and China and manage security challenges
elsewhere across Africa, the Middle East, and Central/
South Asia. As demonstrated above, the relevance
of NATO and the EU is directly related to how they
support, or hinder the achievement of U.S. national
interests via its grand strategy. NATO and the EU are
also critical elements in maintaining the viability and
stability of major global systems and the current international order. As a recent RAND report concluded,
“[O]rder is easiest to create and has its greatest effects
among states that share significant norms and values.”105 NATO and the EU represent organizations
whose members share these values with the United
States and possess significant capabilities to pursue
mutual interests. The question then becomes how to
deal with these organizations to further U.S. values
and interests in the future. This monograph recommends three ways to do just that.

45

First, the United States must maintain flexibility
and resilience in the face of numerous, complex challenges. In 2017, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments published an insightful study of American grand strategy, Critical Assumptions and American
Grand Strategy.106 This study argued that the United
States should “pursue offsets and hedges” that could
mitigate unfavorable global trends.107 One offset would
be to strengthen partnerships with like-minded nations
(e.g., Japan) and to rely upon coalitions of willing states
when NATO and the EU lacked the consensus or capabilities to support U.S. initiatives. These offsets could
provide greater flexibility and decisiveness when solutions needed to be adopted quickly, or in areas where
allied interests diverge. Offsets could still benefit from
the interoperability provided by NATO allies, or their
partnership programs.
Hedging would suggest that the United States
invest more, and not less, into its relationship with
both NATO and the EU.108 This means continued U.S.
presence and cooperation in Europe, closer economic
and political ties, and U.S. support for an orderly British exit from the EU. While the United States should
certainly work to strengthen other partnerships, it
should invest more energy and resources in NATO
and the EU as bulwarks of the global liberal order.
Those proven institutions provide the prosperity, stability, and democratic values to promote U.S. interests
in Europe and the world. While NATO had shifted its
focus away from collective defense after the fall of the
Soviet Union, it is time that it refocus on Article 5 capabilities, while retaining the ability to conduct crisis
management and cooperative security missions.
The second recommendation would be to continue
to pressure NATO allies to increase their capabilities,
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while taking a more nuanced view of burden sharing.
The United States should negotiate with its allies and
where necessary provide incentives and other side
payments to overcome their rational incentives to free
ride on U.S. power and security. While some consider
the norm of spending 2 percent of GDP on the military
as an arbitrary figure, it represents an easy to measure
(and understand) benchmark. As long as it remains the
norm, the U.S. public will expect NATO allies to meet
their commitments; perceptions matter in sustaining
public support for NATO. The Alliance needs to come
to an agreement about what contributions it expects
from its members and articulate that standard in an
easily understood format.109
In addition to increasing spending, the United States
must continue to prod NATO and its allies to improve
their collective defense capabilities, readiness, and forward presence. It must also support NATO efforts to
promote innovation and sharing. Whatever approaches
the United States decides to pursue, the irreplaceable
contribution of NATO to collective defense must be
retained, as well as the principles of solidarity and reciprocity within the Trans-Atlantic community. As two
scholars on NATO burden sharing have argued, “past
successes and failures . . . show that mission accomplishment requires give and take, including the occasional acceptance of unequal costs and benefits among
the members.”110 As shown earlier in this monograph,
NATO and its European allies already bring a great
deal of diplomatic, intelligence, foreign assistance,
and military capability. What European allies lack in
peer-equivalent military capabilities, they make up for
in robust capabilities in other instruments of national
power. In addition, the United States should support
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enhanced cooperation by member states under the
PESCO framework.
The final recommendation is that the United States
should strengthen its ties to the EU and promote greater
NATO and EU cooperation. Whether or not the TTIP
is approved, the United States should push to promote
a harmonization of regulations and a reduction in
trade barriers that inhibit economic growth. However,
pursuing trade wars with the EU is unhelpful in this
regard. Brexit is another challenge facing Europe and
the U.S.-EU relationship. While the United Kingdom
will remain an important member in NATO, its status
in the EU is being negotiated. Not only will a hard Brexit
reduce the EU’s (and the United Kingdom’s) economic
heft, but Brexit could also significantly impact the EU’s
capabilities under CSFP to conduct crisis management
operations and to combat terrorism.111 Not only that,
Brexit could also undermine the survival of the EU
itself. “Brexit foretells the potential demise of the EU,
a democratic bulwark to authoritarian Russia’s predatory strategy of divide and conquer.”112 The United
States must support its British and European allies as
they navigate this difficult process. Perhaps NATO’s
adaptation to accommodate France’s withdrawal from
the integrated military structure provides some lesson
for how the EU can best manage Brexit. The survival of
the EU is a vital interest to the United States.113
CONCLUSION
In reviewing U.S. national interests, the strengths
and weaknesses of NATO and the EU, and the possible grand strategies available to the United States, it is
clear that the United States is better able to pursue its
national interests in concert, rather than in competition
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with these two institutions. The United States is facing
numerous threats and challenges to its interests in
Europe and globally that both the EU and NATO are
uniquely capable of addressing. Their institutional
capacity, experience, and competency in these areas
provide added value to U.S. efforts to address these
challenges. These institutions also give European
countries the ability to exert influence globally, often in
support of common U.S.-European interests.114 While
there are numerous challenges facing Europe, a united
Europe is still a formidable power.115 More importantly, Europe is a region that shares U.S. values and
interests across a broad spectrum of issues. Europe
represents the largest and most robust partner in the
community of free nations seeking to spread the ideals
that John Locke characterized as life, liberty, and estate.
Only if the United States pursues a more isolationist
grand strategy, what Hal Brands called a zero-sum
approach, do NATO and the EU become less relevant,
or even harmful to U.S. interests.116 Even then, the cost
of wrongly gauging the geopolitical environment and
rashly dismantling NATO or marginalizing the EU are
dramatic. It would not be an easy matter to reassemble these enduring institutions if the United States later
decided to change course.
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